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ROBERT T. JONES

Fundamentals of International
Licensing Agreements and Their
Application in the
European Community
Introduction
Legal philosophers have been wrestling for centuries to define 'property,' but have never advanced much further than the tautology that property
is what the law says it is.
This problem has caused practising lawyers very little loss of sleep.
Instinctively, if inarticulately, we all know what property is.
The situation is similar with regard to licensing. Although licensing can
take a myriad of forms, and is not easily susceptible of definition, most
lawyers have a feeling for what it means.
It is simple to suggest that licensing is a right to use property belonging
to another, but this remits one to the question of what is 'property' as well
as to what is meant by 'use.'
These definitional problems are not entirely academic, as among the
issues with which the courts are increasingly dealing, are the kinds of
property which can be licensed, and the extent of the restrictions which
can be placed upon a license and yet have it remain a license.
Distinction from Sales or Assignments
A threshold point is that licenses, insofar as they generally presuppose
transfer of a grantor's ownership rights, are to be distinguished from sales
or assignments.
This distinction has importance in the infrigement area, since in some
Robert T. Jones, A.B. Stanford, 1960; LL.B. Harvard, 1963. Resident partner in London, Law Office Frank Boas, London and Brussels.
Based on a lecture in the series, "Corporate, Fiscal and Labour Problems in the
European Community," given by the author at the Polytechnic of Central London, London,
March 11, 1972. Intended as a companion piece to the author's PracticalAspects of Commercial Agency and Distribution Agreements in the European Community, 6 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 107 (1972).
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jurisdictions it is only the holder of the underlying property right, e.g., a
patentee or his assignee, who has standing to sue for infringement.
For example, in Belgium the right to sue infringers belongs to the patent
holder only. If the license is exclusive, the patentee has an obligation to
sue, but with a non-exclusive license he does not.'
In some countries this problem can be cured by a contractual provision
2
authorizing the licensee to sue, but in Belgium such clauses are void.
In Italy 3 and Germany, 4 exclusive licensees are entitled to sue in their
own names for infringement, but non-exclusive licensees may not. Therefore, in these countries, and France and Belgium as well, an obligation on
the licensor to proceed against infringers should be specified in the contract.
These illustrations may suggest the generalization that non-exclusive or
simple licenses, in the main, have effect only as between the contracting
parties, while exclusive licenses can give rights against third parties, at
least where the property licensed is of a protected nature such as patents or
trademarks.
In the Netherlands, the standing to sue situation is slightly different.
Absent a contractual authorization to sue for infringement, a patent licensee cannot sue unless the patentee has been notified of the infringement and
failed for two months to take action. A trademark licensee has no right to
sue, so a contractual procedure for taking action against infringers should
be provided 5
As assignee or purchaser has no problem with standing to sue in countries where it is a problem for the licensee, so long as he has met the
transfer-of-registration requirements, since an assignee or purchaser is
deemed to stand as an owner.
Tax Aspects of the Distinction
The distinction between assignment and license also has importance in
the tax field. In some jurisdictions, the consideration for transfer of underlying industrial property rights is taxed to the transferor in a different way
from royalty receipts.
For example, in the United States, if one transfers all substantial rights
1

Belgian Law of May 24, 1854, as most recently modified by the Law of June I, 1964
(Moniteur Beige, June 19, 1964), art. 4.
2Repertoire Practique du Droit Beige, BREVETS D'INVENTION, No. 301 (1949).
3
Oriani, Licensing in Italy, in Pollzien & Bronfen, eds., INTERNATIONAL LICENSING
AGREEMENTS (N.Y. 1965), p. 175.
4
Reimer, Patentgesetz und Gebrauchsmustergesetz § 9, Anm. 84, 63, 7, 71 (3d ed.,
Cologne 1968).
5
Netherlands Patent Act (Octrooiwet), 1912 as amended, art. 43, para. 5.
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to make, use and sell under a patent within a specified territory, the
transaction is deemed a transfer of a capital assetP The consideration is
taxed to the transferor at the capital gain rate, which is considerably less
than the rate applicable to ordinary royalty income.
This favorable treatment can be obtained even if the payment of the
consideration is made periodically and calculated according to the productivity or use of the property involved, in a fashion similar to the normal
7
royalty.
The other side of the coin is that such capital payments are normally not
deductible in arriving at taxable income for the purchaser of the patent,
whereas royalty payments on a license would be. However, this may not
make too much difference as the purchaser's cost of the patent can be
amortized.8
In international situations, it is sometimes possible to manage things so
that the payment is deductible as a royalty for the transferee, say in
Belgium, and still qualifies as a capital payment to the transferor in the
United States.
As these consequences are important, and result from legal notions of
whether a document comports a license or a sale, a significant burden falls
upon the draftsman to make clear both exactly what has been transferred
and the nature of the consideration.
Even careful drafting may not be dispositive, as on occasion the courts
will require substance to govern form. For example, in France, the courts
have held purported exclusive trademark licenses, drawn to endure for the
life of the mark, to be defacto sales for both property and tax purposes.9
Why Licensing?
There are several reasons why an enterprise might choose to license its
products.
First and foremost, licensing is the cheapest way of penetrating a foreign
market. No investment and no labor force is required, as would be the case
if one went into business directly in the foreign country.
Secondly, the risks are minimal. A licensor has little exposure to the
OU.S. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1235. See Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252
(1891): Vincent A. Marco, 25 T.C. 544 (1955), Comm. acq. 1958-2 CuM. BUL. 6.
7As to tax effect of field-of-use restrictions, compare United States v. Carruthers, 219
F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955): First National Bank of Princeton v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818
(D. N.J. 1956);Milton P. Laurent, 34 T.C. 385 (1960); and Wm. S. Rouverol, 42 T.C. 186
(1964), with Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 655 (66th Cir. 197 1). As to know-how sales,
see Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Heil Company, 38
T.C. 989 (1962), Comm. acq. 1963-1 CuM. BUL. 4.

8

See

MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,

§§ 23.72-76 (Mundelein, Illinois,

1972).
9
See Nouel, Licensing in France,in Pollzien and Bronfen, eds., INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENTS (N.Y. 1965), p. 129.
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pitfalls which can arise in doing business abroad, ranging from the dangers
of expropriation to making a mis-step due to ignorance of foreign labor or
investment laws.
Moreover, licensing is probably the easiest method of getting started and
giving one's products exposure in a foreign country. Especially for an
enterprise which has little experience abroad, licensing is often a far better
way of entering a foreign market than starting from scratch.
Although there is a certain danger that a foreign licensee may become a
competitor of the licensor after the license terminates, this is usually
outweighed by the likelihood that the parties will become more closely
associated and enter into partnership, or the licensor take over the operations of the licensee as a going concern.
Licensing also has certain tax advantages. Under most of the double tax
relief conventions of recent years, licensing royalties may be paid out of
one country to a foreign licensor with little or no withholding tax, and
certainly less tax than would be payable on profits and dividends if one
chose the alternative of doing business through a foreign subsidiary. 10
In most cases, the royalty withholding rates between the United
States,1 ' England' 2 and EEC countries are nil. Lump-sum payments in lieu
of royalties also generally escape withholding.
10 indeed, the OECD draft model double taxation convention, which has been the basis
of most recent double taxation treaties between developed countries, provides for no withholding on royalties paid to a foreign resident if the royalty recipient has no permanent
establishment in the country from which payments are made. See REPORT OF THE OECD
FISCAL COMMITTEE,

DRAFT DOUBLE

TAXATION CONVENTION

ON INCOME

AND CAPITAL

(Paris 1963).
"National income tax withholding rates on patent royalties paid to non-resident U.S.
enterprises from EEC countries:
Normal Rate
20%
19.2% (effective
rate)
25.75% (effective
rate
28.125% (on 23 of
gross)
12%
Nil

Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands

Treaty Rate
Nil
5%
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil

' 2National income tax withholding rates on patent royalties paid to non-resident U.K.
enterprises from EEC countries:
Normal Rate
Treaty Rate
Belgium
20%
Nil
France
19.2% (effective
Nil
rate)
Germany
25.75V( (effective
Nil
rate)
Italy
28.125% (on 2/a of
Nil
gross)
Luxembourg
12.0%
5%
Netherlands
Nil
Nil
lntarn.,glnnnt

t rtwvr

Vd

7
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I
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Royalties, as well as lump-sum payments, are subject to value added tax
on the Continent, but the burden falls on the licensee, and is not really a
burden, since he can recover it by way of credit against the V.A.T. he must
pay. Still, for safety, an international licensor is advised to include a
provision in his license agreement that royalties will be paid net of V.A.T.
On the negative side, it must be admitted that licensing has the disadvantage of minimizing the amount of control which the licensor can
exercise over production and distribution. Also, while it reduces the economic risks to the licensor, licensing normally can be expected to produce
a lower long-term profit return than would a successful direct manufacturing and sales system.
Weighing these pros and cons, it would seem that licensing is most
appropriate either for small companies, when a substantial investment is
not possible, or in cases in which the market to be licensed will require
relatively limited quantities of goods and mass production is not required.
It makes little sense for a large company to license a product for mass
production when it could be the primary producer and probably realize a
greater profit. Although there are exceptions, the American approach to
direct investment versus licensing in Europe has tended to follow this view.
American business with Japan, on the other hand, has inclined more to
the licensing system, but this is because of the heavy restrictions on foreign
ownership participations in Japan.
A Licensing Glossary

A vocabulary or jargon has grown up in the licensing field. In many
cases the terms are of English or American origin and are used on the
Continent in default of good translations.
A prime example is the ubiquitous term know-how. Except for the
occasional and usually inadequate definition in a tax statute,1 3 this term is
in most instances, not defined in municipal law. Of course, it refers generally to the information and techniques necessary to carry out or apply
business processes.
In many respects, know-how licenses are a breed apart and some of their
peculiar facets are discussed hereunder.
The term parallel licensing, or multiple parallel licensing, classically

refers to grant of similar exclusive licenses for the same industrial property
to two or more parties in different territories. In the European context, the
term also is used to refer to grants given to two or more parties of the
'3 E.g., English Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970, § 386(7). Compare U.S. REV.
PROC. 69-19, I.R.B. 1969-39, 12.
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patent or mark, for the same product taken out in different countries. For
example, a grant of the French patent for a product to one party, and of the
German patent to another party.
When a party purchases goods in one country and imports them into a
second country in which there exists a licensee who is marketing the same
products, the first party is said to be a parallel importer, and considerable
litigation has centered around the right of the second party to prevent
parallel imports by means of various devices, including industrial property
licenses.
The traditional companion of parallel licensing in Europe, especially
when the licensed property, itself, does not guarantee territorial exclusivity, has been export prohibition clauses. These are clauses which
prohibit a licensee from exporting outside his territory and from selling to
customers who intend to export and usually oblige the licensor to require
other parallellicensees also to refrain from exporting or selling for export.
Prior to the advent of the competition rules of the Rome Treaty, the
combination of parallel licensing and export prohibition clauses was

frequently used to carve up the European market into national units which
were the truly exclusive preserve of each national licensee. This has come
to be known as absolute territorial protection. The recent legal devel-

opment, examined hereunder, has made this technique extremely dangerous from the competition law standpoint, as it inhibits the primary
purposes of the Treaty of having one unified European market.
The term tied license or tying arrangements refers to contractual ar-

rangements requiring the licensee to purchase from a particular source any
articles other than the licensed article, or to refrain from purchasing or
using items not supplied from a particular source. These arrangements are
prohibited by national law in many cases, e.g., Section 57 of the English
Patents Act which provides that the penalty for inclusion of these arrangements is nullification of the patent in question. 14 They also create severe
EEC competition law problems.
One can unwittingly fall into a tied license situation when the licensor is
intended to be a supplier of raw materials to his licensee. Supply, of course,
is permissible, but it is advisable never to make it a condition of a license
agreement.
The term package licensing refers to a situation in which several patents, either related or unrelated, are licensed as a group to one licensee. It
has a pejorative connotation when the licensor is in a position to force the
14
Curiously, there seems to be no counterpart of Sec. 57 in English trademarks legislation, a loophole which would seem to want correction.
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licensee to take licenses he does not want in order to get the one or two
licenses he does need.
It can happen that a party has a patent which he cannot exploit because
another party holds a patent for another part of the end product or process
and, indeed, the second party may be blocked by the patent of the first
party. This situation can be alleviated by reciprocal grant of licenses, and
this is known as cross licensing.
Another way of solving this problem, and also facilitating grant of
sublicenses for combined patents, is for the holders to place the patents
either by license or assignment with a common holder and take licenses in
return, or license third parties, if need be. This is called patentpooling.
Defined field licensing is still another approach. Rather than granting a
license under specified patents, a general license to operate in a defined
field may be appropriate. This is especially true when the technology is
complex so that know-how, rather than patents, is of primary importance.
Such licenses are usually non-exclusive and frequently are limited to a
specific commercial plant.
Licensee estoppel refers either to judicial doctrine or contractual provisions (sometimes called non-aggression or non-attack clauses), preventing
a licensee from attacking the validity of his licensor's patent or mark.
[Even though it had been a time-honoured doctrineI licensee estoppel has
been invalided in American licensing by the 1969 United States Supreme
Court decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins. 15 Contractual provisions of this
nature may also be invalid in Holland, but they appear to be valid in
France and Belgium and, to a limited extent, in Germany. 16 English law
also recognizes the estoppel principle.
The term field-of-use restrictions refers to limitations in a license to
specific technical or commercial fields and no others, the other fields of
exploitation being reserved to the licensor.
Another important term is grant-backs. This relates to the improvements
which a licensee may make on a licensed product when using it. The
licensor may desire to reserve a right to such improvements in the future
and will normally require that details of such improvements be communicated to him. As to future improvement patents, the licensor may require
that licenses, even exclusive licenses, be given to him, or that such patents
be assigned back to him.
Grant-back clauses of this nature can give rise to charges of patent
mis-use, for the reason that they can be used by the larger industrial
15395 U.S. 653 (1969).
'German Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) Tatigkeitsbericht 1965, p. 64; 1966, p. 73;
19 69 , p. 98: 19 61,p. 5 8 ; 1967, p. 88: 1968, p. 88; 1965, p. 53.
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corporations as a way of perpetuating their domination of a field beyond
the term of the original patent. For instance, if a patent is granted for
seventeen years, but during the course of that term the state of the art
advances and the patentee has reserved rights to all future patents, his
monopoly can be considerably extended. For this reason, the United States
Department of Justice has signaled its intention to attack exclusive
17
grant-back clauses as illegal per se.
The Legal Context of Licensing
The kinds of property which may be subject to a license are as broad as
the definition of property itself. In the field of industrial property, the most
common subjects are patents, trademarks, tradenames, copyrights, designs,
know-how and trade secrets. A rather vague and new area is computer
18
programs.
These industrial property rights arise and are governed by municipal
law. They vary considerably from country to country. For example, in
Italy at present, 19 and until 1960 in France, pharmaceutical products could
not be patented.
Patents for medicines in France are now subject to considerations of
public welfare, and if the patentee does not sufficiently exploit the product
by producing sufficient quantity at reasonable prices, the patent can be
20
limited or withdrawn or official licenses given.
Thus, a necessary first step in any licensing of industrial property is to
examine in detail the scope of the subject property and the restrictions
placed upon it by local law.
By and large, national patent laws give patentees the right to exclusivity
within the country of issuance, at least until the first sale of the product.
This has usually been construed to include the right to bar parallel importations of the product from abroad. The latter feature of the national industrial property laws seems to be in conflict with the notion of one unified
Common Market, and is a source of considerable controversy in the EEC.
In licensing in the international context, one must also consider the
various treaties which overlay national law. Among the most important are
"Address of Assistant Attorney General McLaren to the PTC Research Institute of
George Washington University, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1969, reprinted in CCH TRADE
REG. REP., para. 50,246 (1969).
18
As to computer programs, cf. Address of P. T. Mitches to the Canadian Computer
Conference, Toronto, September 15- 17, 1971, reprinted in 7 LES NOuVELLES 29. (LEs
NOUVELLES is the journal of the Licensing Executives Society.)
19Italian Royal Decree No. 1127, June 29, 1939, Article 14. See Italian Civil Code, arts.
2584-91.
20
French Law No. 68-I, January 2, 1968, arts. 37-38.
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the Paris Convention (1883) on industrial property (and the subsequent
development toward a European patent), the Berne Copyright Union
(1886) and Universal Copyright Convention (1952) in the field of copyright, and the Arrangement of Madrid (1891), as well as the Benelux
21
Uniform Trade Mark Law (1969), in the trademark area.
Heed in license drafting must also be given to the omnipresent threats of
domestic restrictive practices legislation, EEC competition law and American anti-trust law, all of which on occasion can have extra-territorial
22
effect.
Generally, those types of industrial property which can be licensed are
also freely alienable, subject in certain instances to changes of registration.
They are also transferable/ by will and capable of being pledged.
In Italy, trademarks are not transferable unless the business using the
mark is also transferred.2 3 The same was true in Belgium until the Benelux
Uniform Trademark Law went into effect last year. Under the Benelux
law, assignments of trademarks must be for all of the Benelux countries as
a bloc, but licenses can be more restrictive as to territory.
The rights of a licensee are generally not assignable without the consent
of the licensor. In Italy and France, for example, the courts have refused to
recognize attempted assignments by licensees, on the theory that it makes
a lifference to the licensor who practices an invention or trademark.
This doctrine probably does not apply in the case of a merger or
takeover of the licensee, and therefore rights of termination in the event of
a major change of ownership of one of the parties to the license should be
provided in the license contract. The pattern of business consolidation is
such today that if one omits to cover this problem, licensees or licensors
may find themselves embarrassingly "in bed" with a major competitor after
the latter merges with, or takes over, the other party to the license.
Know-How and Trade Secrets
Know-how and trade secrets are a special case in industrial property.
Essentially, know-how licenses are contractual arrangements inter se, for
disclosing information not generally available. There is no guaranteed exclusivity and anyone else is free to use the information, if he can discover
21

Texts (except Benelux law) in English available in the UNESCO looseleaf publication,

LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
DESIGN
22

WORLD/(Leyden 1966).

See Wallace, MultinationalPatent and Know-how Arrangements, 39 ANTITRUST L.J.
791 (1970). EEC competition'law and German cartel law can also have extra-territorial effect;
see Derin ger, A Practitioner Looks at the German and EEC Rules, in the ABA booklet
CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE (Theberge, ed., Chicago, 1971).
23

ltalian Decree No. 929, June 21, 1942.
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and apply it. Accordingly, secrecy obligations on both parties-and not
only the parties, but also their employees-are the most important features
of know-how licenses. Their strength lies solely with the rules and remedies of municipal contract law.
A licensee of know-how can be placed in an awkward position if the
know-how-e.g. a manufacturing process-is discovered and used by a
third party. The licensee may find himself paying royalties, while his
competitor is marketing the products without any royalty burden, and thus
can sell them more cheaply with the same profit. There appears to be no
principle of law which intervenes here to relieve the licensee, and, theoretically, an obligation to pay royalties can continue in perpetuity.2 4
For this reason, it is essential in know-how contracts, to provide for a
reduction or abatement of royalties if a third party acquires and uses the
know-how. For instance, a clause can be included to the effect that if,
during the period of the agreement, the know-how is published or falls into
the public domain otherwise than through the fault of the licensee, the
amounts of royalties payable shall be reduced in amounts proportional to
the lessened value of the know-how to the licensee as a result of such
publication.
A similar clause should be provided in the event that a third party
obtains a patent on the know-how. Such a clause may force the parties into
a dispute or arbitration as to what the lessened value is, but even that is
better than continuing to pay royalties at the original rate.
It is also essential in know-how contracts to provide that the licensee
may continue to use the know-how after termination of the license. Otherwise, a licensee of know-how whose license has been terminated, can find
himself with a sizeable plant based on his former license and no right to use
it.
Furthermore, one must keep careful records of the use and disposition of
licensed know-how. If the know-how is allowed to become mixed and
jumbled with the licensee's own technology, he can be confronted with an
impossible job of "unscrambling the omelette," when the license terminates
24

However, German law may require that know-how agreements become unenforceable
after such time as the know-how becomes generally known. See Explanatory Notes to
Articles 20 and 21 of the German Act Against Restraints on Competition in the looseleaf
OECD GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (Paris, 1966). Moreover, at least one American writer seems to have suggested that a logical result of Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins is that know-how royalty arrangements might be required to terminate once the
know-how becomes public. See Adelman, An Antitrust Decision:Lear v. Adkins, 58 A.B.A.J.
45 (1972). In Mr. Adelman's words: "'Lear,when properly viewed as an antitrust case, dealt
with the question of whether it constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade to collect
royalties on a previously secret invention once it has been disclosed to the public." (At p. 46).
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if, as is commonly provided, he must "return" the know-how, or documents relating to it, to his licensor.
An interesting sidelight was cast on know-how by the case of Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins, 25 which raised the issue of whether know-how could be licensed
at all. The argument of Justice Black in a separate opinion, ran that the
American federal government has specifically accorded certain protection
to ideas by the patent law, and the patent law should be exclusive because
it pre-empts the field. Any other protection of ideas, such as the secrecy
provisions of a know-how agreement, should be deemed in derogation of
free-competition and the notion that ideas should be freely accessible to all.
One lower court subsequently so held-that is, said know-how licensing is
completely invalid-but to the great relief of the patent bar, this decision
26
was reversed on appeal.
Mr. Justice Black's position in the Lear case, was anticipated by two
decisions he authored in 1964, the Sears2 7 and Compco28 cases, which held
that a State unfair competition law could not be used to prevent a third
party from making and selling identical 'Chinese' copies of unpatentable
designs. In these cases, the designs were certain kinds of lighting fixtures.
Again, the reasoning was that the patent law is the only form of protection
29
available; absent a patent, anyone can copy the idea.
The position in Europe seems universally to be that know-how can be
licensed, and that royalty and secrecy provisions in respect of it are
enforceable. Certainly, this is the better view, as know-how is a most
important kind of property and licensing promotes its dissemination. Under
the view of Justice Black, the only way a person could exploit his
know-how, would be by keeping it in his bosom and using it himself.
Elements of a Licensing Contract

It is difficult to generalize about drafting license contracts in any useful
way, as most of the problems are sui generis for each kind of property and
country, but it could be helpful to mention some provisions which a typical
agreement might contain. Reference may also usefully be made to a checklist of the kind set out in the Appendix.
The one universal generalization which can be made is that licensing on
25395
U.S. 653, supra, note 15.
26
Painton v. Bourns, 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.
1971).27
Sears, Roebuck v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
28
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
29
Cf.Lahr, The Federal Preemption Doctrine: Protection of Industrial Property and Its
Relation to the Sherman Act, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 812 (1970).
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the Continent is a matter of contract. No special form of agreement is
required in any country, and even oral licenses can be valid.
This means that in drafting a license agreement for Europe, one can feel
relatively free to use his usual form of agreement, at least as a beginning
draft. Indeed, the author starts from the premise that 'contract is contract'
the world over; if one can draft something which is intelligible, it does not
matter what form is used.
It is standard English practice to divide licensing agreements into two
parts, one being the contractual provisions and the other the formal license.
This is done for English registration purposes, so that the terms of the
contract other than the specific grant, e.g. royalties, do not appear of public
record. While this is not usual on the Continent, it seems unobjectionable
as a matter of form, so long as the two pieces of paper, the contract and the
license, are clearly integrated.
Registration is generally optional for a license agreement in Europe, but
it is often advantageous for the licensee to register. For example, in the
Netherlands, registration puts third parties on notice of the license, and will
help protect the licensee if the patentee should grant licenses or assignments to others. Also, the patent office is notified by registration of the
license and will inform the licensee if the patent is not kept in force by
30
payment of annual fees.
Likewise, in France, a licensee who has not registered might lose his
rights in case the licensor grants another license or sells his rights to a third
party. However, apparently relatively few license agreements are regis3
tered in practice. '
A typical agreement would begin with a preamble describing the subject
matter of the license, perhaps referring to a schedule for the details, patent
claims and numbers, etc.
Next would come the granting clause, defining the scope of the license
and whether it is exclusive or not.
When a licensor grants an unlimited exclusive license, normally he is
precluded from practising the invention himself and from granting licenses
to others. 32 In France, however, and possibly elsewhere, the licensor
retains the right to make personal use of the invention unless contractually
waived.33
Of course, in a non-exclusive license, the licensor may properly exercise
3

6Cf. Netherlands Patent Act, 1912, as amended, art. 34.

31
See
32

Nouel, supra note 9.
See Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., 84 U.S.P.Q. 54, 65 (9th
Cir. 1949);
Rollman v. Commissioner, 113 U.S.P.Q. 356, 361 (4th Cir. 1957).
33
Nouel, supra note 9.
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rights under the invention himself, and may authorize others to use it.
It is also possible to have various hybrid arrangements by which the
rights licensed are partially exclusive. For example, the license may be
exclusive except as to the licensor himself or a prior non-exclusive li34
censee.
A patent right is normally for the manufacture, use and sale of the
patented item, but these facets are divisible for licensing purposes. For
example, the grant might be to make and use, but not sell, the licensed
35
device.
In most countries, a license may be properly granted under a patent
application, as well as under a patent. In this case, an additional provision
for cut-off of the obligation to pay royalties should be incorporated to cover
the contingency of denial or limitation of the application by the patent
office.
A patent licensee ordinarily has an implied right to have others make
licensed devices for it, but as implied rights are always open to question
36
one should be explicit about whether this is to be allowed.
The scope of the license may be subject to restrictions of many kinds.
For example, a patent may contain two sets of claims, one directed to a
process, the other to an apparatus, and the license may grant the right to
use one or the other, but not both. Similarly, various 'field-of-use' restrictions of the kind mentioned earlier, such as only to sell in the
non-commercial field, as well as quantity or territorial restrictions may be
imposed.
Ordinarily, a licensee does not have an implied right to grant sublicenses.3 7 Therefore, this should be bargained for and covered by an express provision. The parties should indicate the terms and conditions to be
embodied in any sublicense, and whether or not the sublicense may have a
duration independent of the primary license. Also, the licensee should be
obliged to furnish the licensor with copies of any sublicenses.3 8
The next provision of interest is the consideration. This can be either a
fixed sum or royalties. A fixed sum might be appropriate if, for example,
34

Mechanical Ice Tray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 62 U.S.P.Q. 397, 402 (2d Cir.

1944).3 5

Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1973); United States v. General Electric Co., 272
U.S. 36
476, 490 (1926).
Compare Harshberger v. Tarrson, 83 U.S.P.Q. 179, 181 (N.D. I11.
1949) with Reynolds Spring Co. v. L.A. Industries, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q. 515, 518 (6th Cir. 1939).
37
See Mathely and Plaisant, Juris-Classeur Commercial, BREVETS D'INVENTION, Fasc.
XXIV, No.'s 43, 72-74 (Paris): compareHeywood-Wakefield Co. v. Small, 37 U.S.P.Q. 363,
369 (lst
3 Cir. 1938).
aCJ National Pigments & Chemical Co. v. K. C. Williams & Co., 94 F.2d 792, 796 (8th
Cir. 1938).
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many small items were involved, and the parties wished to avoid detailed
record-keeping which percentage royalties on each item sold might entail.
Royalties can be calculated in various ways, but are usually determined
on the basis of sales or output. Of course, timing of when the payment is
due, means payment and rights of audit need to be covered.
A recent United States Supreme Court case has found it patent mis-use
to insist on a royalty calculated on the basis of a percentage of a licensee's
total sales when the patented product is not used at all by the licensee. 39 So
the royalty should bear some reasonable relationship to use, unless both
40
parties agree on some other formula for their mutual convenience.
To guarantee that the licensor will receive some compensation, provision
may be made for the payment of minimum royalties for a specified term.
Failing this, the parties might provide that upon the licensee's failure to
make minimum performance, the license will be converted from exclusive
to non-exclusive or be subject to cancellation.
Payment of royalties or technical assistance fees to foreigners is subject
to prior governmental approval in France, and the authorities on occasion
have frowned upon minimum royalty provisions on the theory that they
might be a way of "dodging" the French exchange control rules.
In representing a non-exclusive licensee, one can ask for a "most favored licensee" clause. This type of clause provides that if the licensor
grants any other license on more favorable terms, such terms shall apply to
the immediate licensee. The clause may embrace all terms of the license or
41
be confined to royalties.
What happens in the case of patent invalidity should also be covered
with regard to royalties. The decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins 42 seems to say
that a licensee can avoid paying royalties altogether on an invalid patent
which he is attacking. The rationale is that, as licensee estoppel is no
longer permitted, the licensee must be able to avoid paying royalties or else
the licensor will drag out the patent litigation interminably. Whether a
licensee has a right to refund of royalties already paid was not decided, but
it is implied by the reasoning of the court that he does if the patent is found
43
to be invalid.
39
Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 at 133- 140
(1969).40
Cf. Glen v. Perfect Fit Industries, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. para. 72,750.
41
Cf. Hazeltine Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 100 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1938).
42395 U.S. 653, supra note 15.
43
Troxel Manufacturing Co. v. Schwinn Bycicle Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. (W.D. Tenn. 1971),
applying Lear, held on a motion for summary judgment, that the licensee was entitled to
refund of all royalties paid, plus interest, under a license agreement for a patent which was
found invalid by another court. This decision may be appealed and was severely criticized in 7
LEs NOUVELLES 40 (1972).
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Next, one would deal with other obligations of the licensee, and these
can include grant-back clauses and licensee estoppel clauses where permitted, and an obligation to work the license. How far one can go with
these restrictions is not clear in Europe, but certainly export prohibitions
imposed on a licensee, or arrangements carving up territories on a basis of
absolute exclusivity, are among the most dangerous from the standpoint of
competition law.
A licensor will frequently desire to require the licensee to mark licensed
devices with the number of the licensed patent. This can be important
because it has been held that if patented devices sold by the licensee are
not properly marked, there can be no recovery against third parties for
44
infringement occuring prior to actual notice.
If a device is to be sold by a licensee under the licensor's trademark, the
requirements of a conventional trademark license should also be considered.
The subject of warranties is a touchy one in patent licensing. Few, if
any, warranties are implied in licenses, so this is always a subject for the
45
contract.
In representing a licensee, reasonable warranties to ask for, include:
-Ownership of the patent by the Licensor;
-No third-party claims;
-The patent will be kept in effect as a formal matter;
-The patent will not be restricted;
-The patent is independent of other previous patents of the same patentee;
and
-No compulsory licenses will be issued.

Most patent lawyers are extremely reluctant ever to give warranties of
patent validity, or that the patent does not infringe any patents of third
parties. One reason for this in the American context is that an astonishing
70 percent of the patents in litigation are currently held invalid, there being
a definite difference of opinion between the patent office and the courts as
6
to what is patentable4
One can feel fairly comfortable warranting that the device works, or is fit
for the purpose intended, but a warranty that it has commercial utility is
-dangerous because rather open ended. Of course, vagueness in warranties
inevitably leads to problems.
44Gordon v. Easy Washing Machine Corp., 39 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. N.Y. 1941).
45Applicance Corp. of America v. Speed Queen Corp., 89 U.S.P.Q. I (7th Cir. 1951);
M. Nirenberg Sons, Inc. v. Trubenizing Process Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q. 464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1941).
46See Sease, The Inventor's Dilemma: Whose Fault?, 58 A.B.A.J. 267 (1972), citing
Gausewitz, Brief in Support of ProposedAmendments to Section 103, Title 35, Patents, U.S.
Code, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 290, 298-299 (1969).
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On the question of governing law, the contract should usually provide
which national law governs the license. Most jurisdictions will accept the
parties' choice of law so long as it bears a reasonable relationship to the
contract. Absent a choice-of-law clause, the law of the country of issuance
of the patent or mark, or the law of the forum state, is usually applied.
Specification of a law other than the law of the country of issuance will
not, of course, govern the validity of the patent or trademark, which is
always a matter of the law of the country where registered. Neither will it
avoid the public policy mandates of the state in which litigation occurs.
It is most common in patent licenses to select the law of the state in
which the patent was granted. As an infringement suit will normally arise in
that state, this avoids the problems of proving foreign law. It also has the
advantage that both the patent and contract matters will be governed by
the same country's law. However, it may be to one's advantage to specify
the law of the licensor's jurisdiction as if, for example, in licensing
know-how in Italy, one felt the English law protecting know-how secrecy
was more clear than the Italian law on the subject. Normally, a reference
to Italian law in this kind of situation would be accepted by the Italian
courts.

47

Arbitration is not too common in patent licensing, but it can have utility,
particularly in deciding royalty disputes, as the courts generally dislike
patent cases, and they take considerable time in deciding them. Generally,
a determination of patent validity must be remitted to the civil courts.
Other provisions which should be included are the method for proceeding against infringers and who bears the costs, duration of the contract,
termination and events of default, but here one can easily adapt from
standard forms.
American Anti-Trust Law
A word about the American experience may be relevant, not only
because it could serve as a model for Europe, but also because in practicing internationally one can feel fairly safe in saying that if a restriction is
permissible under United States law, it will probably be permissible in
most foreign countries. This is not universally true, of course, but it is a
good rule of thumb.
Applying this rule of thumb may not be easy as, after more than eight
years of anti-trust legislation on the books, the American anti-trust law of
licensing is still unsettled, and Lear, Inc. v. Adkins 48 has not clarified
matters. At least, however, a few problem areas can be indicated.
47

See Introductory Provisions, Italian Civil Code, art. 24.
U.S. 653, supra note 15.

48395
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The starting point is that while it is of the essence of patent law that it
confers a monopoly, a public policy bias for free competition requires the
monopoly to be construed restrictively. Thus, any attempt to exceed the
legal monopoly enters the anti-trust field. As a result, tied licenses and
agreements not to deal in goods which compete with products covered by
licensed patents have long been subject to attack under the anti-trust laws.
More recently, the Department of Justice has announced a two-fold test
for licensing provisions:
(1) Is the provision justifiable as necessary to exploit the patent monopoly?
and
(11) Are less49restrictive alternatives available which are more likely to foster
competition?
Even if a provision satisfies the first test, it must still meet the second.
50
Under these tests, the following are subject to attack:
I. Grant-back clauses, especially if exclusive. 51
2. Field of use restrictions, especially if they2divide such fields among licensees who would otherwise be competitors
3. Restrictions on themanner in which a licensee who has purchased products from his licensor can resell them. For example, in the pharmaceutical
on a licensee requiring him to resell in dosage form
field, a restriction 53
rather than in bulk.
4. Restrictions which give licensees the right of prior approval of grant of
other licenses. The thought is that a veto of this nature imports elements
54
of collusion, and licensors should be free to license all whom they wish.
5. Restrictions which give the licensor power to fix prices of the licensee.
This practice was originally upheld in the 1926 General Electric case,55

49
5

Address of Assistant Attorney General McLaren, supra note 17.
For an excellent review of the Justice Department policy announcements and

recently-filed cases, see Kittler, Current State of Patent and Know-how Licensing, 27 BUsi-

69 1 (1972).
CompareTransparent-WrapMach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947);
Stokes & Smith Corp. v. Transparent-Wrap Corp., 161 F.2d 565 (2dI Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 787 (1947), with United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 847
(D. N.J. 1953); United States v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (D. Wis. Dec. 30,
1969-5 2 Consent decree).
NESS LAWYER
51

Compare General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955- 1968: A SUPPLEMENT TO

(1938), with the comments in

THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE

TRUST LAWS,

TO STUDY THE ANTI-

at 72 (Washington, D.C., 1968); United States v. Fisons, Ltd., Civil Action

N.D. Ill. filed July 23, 1969.
No. 69-C,
53
See United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. I (D.C. 1969), 328 F. Supp. 709
(D.C.5 41971); United States v. Birdsboro Steel Co., 139 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
Compare United States v. Besser Manufacturing Co., 96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich.
1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952), with United States v. Krasnov, 335 U.S. 5 (1957),
affirming per curiam 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956).Cf. McCullough v. Wells Surveys,
343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965).
5
United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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6.
7.
8.
9.

but the holding has been whittled away, especially when collusion56between
two or more dominant companies in an industry may be involved.
get the license
Package licensing, especially when the licensee, in order5to
7
he wants, is forced to take other licenses in another area.5 8
Use of discriminatory royalty rates for ulterior purposes.
Licensee estoppel clauses.59
Operation under an invalid patent. The Justice department has indicated it
will attack the validity of patents in certain instances, as it is certainly an
abuse of the patent laws to claim the monopoly when it is not justified 0

In addition to criminal and civil sanctions, remedies available for patent
misuse in the United States include compulsory licensing, declaration of
patent invalidity, and a general injunction because of the misuse.6 1
Although the American law contains a number of things which are illegal
per se, a "rule of reason" is more generally applied which judges the
economic effect of restrictions.
The Justice Department has recently promulgated some guidelines for
licensing in the international area, which may be commended to all practitioners concerned With the international scope of the American anti-trust
laws.6 2 A number of detailed hypothetical cases of international licenses of
56

SeeUnited States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S.287 (1948): United States v. Huck
Manufacturing Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965), affg per curiam 227 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Mich.
1964); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. (1948); Barber Colman Co. v. National Tool Co., 136 F.2d 339
1943).
(6th Cir.
57Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969): American
Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959): McCullough v. Wells
Surveys, 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965).
58
La Peyre v. F.T.C., 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966); Laitram v. King Crab, 244 F. Supp:
9, new trial denied, 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alaska 1965): Peelers Co. v. Weindt, 260 F. Supp.
193 (W.D. Wash. 1966). As to discrimination in granting licenses among competitors, compare Allied Research Products, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. I1. 1969),
questioned in Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Products, Inc., 438 F.2d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 197 1),
with Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
59

See Bendix Corp. v. Balax, 421 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1970): United States v. Ciba Corp.,

Civil Action No.'s 79 1-69 and 792-69 (D. N.J., filed July 9, 1969). United States v. Fisons
Ltd., Civil Action No. 69C 1530 (N.D. Ill., filed July 23, 1969).
6
°See United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. I (D.C. Cir. 1969); Stern,

Antitrust Implications of Lear v. Adkins, XV

THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN

663 (1970). (Mr.

Stern is Chief, Patent Unit, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division); Day, Relation of
Patent Validity to Antitrust, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 801 (1970). As to the situation of fraudulent
representation to the Patent Office as a basis for antitrust violation, see Beckman Instruments,
Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1132 (W.D. Tex. 1971): Cataphote Corp. v. De Soto
F.2d - 171 U.S.P.Q. 736 (9th Cir. 1971): SCM Corp. v.
Chemical Coatings, Inc., Radio61Corporation of America, 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
Cf. Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 5 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. para. 73,568 (2d Cir. 1971): cf. Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation, 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876
(1945).62

Memorandum of the Department of Justice Concerning Antitrust and Foreign Commerce, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. para. 50, 129 (1972).
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patents and know-how are discussed. The guidelines give an impression of
surprising latitude in present Government anti-trust thinking, if not entirely
pellucid reasoning.
Common Market Competition Law
The competition law of the European Community is based mainly on
Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty.
Article 85(0) generally prohibits agreements or concerted practices
which affect trade between member states and are liable to prevent, distort
or restrict competition, specifically including price-fixing, marketing sharing, price discrimination, etc. A possibility of exemption is provided by
Article 85(3) for agreements which contribute to improvements of production, distribution, technology or economic progress.
Article 86 interdicts abuse of a dominant market position by any enterprise, including inter alia imposition of unfair or unequal prices or trading
conditions, limitation of production, tying arrangements and the like.
The implications of these Treaty provisions for licensing have been
elaborated in three principal sources: (1) An announcement of the EEC
Commission of December 24, 1962 relating to patent licensing agreements,
known for its date of issue as the "Christmas Message"; 6 3 (2) Commission
Regulation 67/67 of March 22, 1967;64 and (3) the case law of the European Court of Justice and the Commission.
Of these, the case law is by far the most important. In several respects,
the case law has overridden the "Christmas Message," so reliance on that
Message must be cautious.
The Conflict Between EEC and Member-State
Industrial Property Law
Before attempting a distillation of the rules which have evolved for
licensing, it is necessary to consider the complex problem of the place of
national industrial property laws in the Common Market setting.
One starts from the premise that a primary purpose of the Rome Treaty
is to achieve unification of the European market in terms of free movement
65
of goods and services between member countries.
EUROPEENES (J.O.) Dec. 24, 1962, 1 CCH
63JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUT'
COMMON MARKET REP. para. 2698.
64J.O. March 22, 1967, I CCH COMMON MARKET REP. para. 2,727. This regulation
expires by its terms Dec. 31, 1972, but the Commission has announced that it intends to
renew the regulation, without other changes, for an additional ten years, i.e. until the end of
1982 65(.1.0. July 20, 1972 C. 79/3).
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, arts. 2-3, 9-11.
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National industrial property laws are natural barriers to achievement of
unification of the European market, to the extent that industrial property
rights conferred by any one country of the Community can be used to bar
importation from other Community countries, thus insulating the country
where protection exists from competition from other member states. 66
Indeed, the traditional marketing pattern in Europe has been on the basis
of national units in which distributors or licensees have been accorded
strict exclusivity which was enforced by various devices including industrial property licenses and export prohibitions.
Reconciliation of this fundamental conflict between the national industrial property laws and the market unification purpose of the Community requires the greatest care lest the structure of the important protections accorded by such laws be pulled down and nothing left in its place.
Modes of Resolution of the Conflict:
1. Law Reform

The Community authorities have attacked this problem on two fronts.
The first is proposed reform of national industrial property laws to conform
to the purposes of the Common Market. This reform is still in a very
preliminary stage.
Illustrative of current thinking, the draft proposals for the Common
Market Patent Convention envision that if a patented product has been put
on the market in one of the member states by a patentee or his licensee, the
patentee of persons 'economically connected' with him and holding parallel
patents for the same product in other member states may not object to its
sale in such other states on patent grounds. In other words, the first
marketing in a member state by a holder of parallel patents, will exhaust
67
the patent protection in all member countries.
2. Development of Competition Law

The second and more fruitful attack to date has been on the front of
66

Alexander, Brevets d'ilnvention et R~gles de Concurrence du Traitg CEE, § 92, p. 180
(Brussels 1971 ) confirms that the right of patentees to bar importations of the patented article
from other countries is a common feature of the national patent legislation of the EEC
countries. The same right has generally been claimed to exist, although the legal basis for it is
less clear, for trade mark holders under national trademark laws. The recent trend in trademark law thinking has been to emphasize the role of the mark as identifying the source of the
product. See the cases discussed in Beier, La Territorialit' du Droit des Marques et les

Echanges
Internationaux,98
67
LAW

JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL

5 (1971).

See Alexander, Industrial Property and the Common Market, 9 COMMON MARKET
REVIEW 35, 45-51 (1972); Deringer, Towards European and EEC Patents, XVI THr

ANTITRUST BULLETIN

151, 158- 162 (1971).
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competition law. The Grundig-Constencase 68 affords a good illustration
of competition law in action.
The German manufacturer, Grundig, had placed an export prohibition
clause upon Consten, its distributor of electronic appliances for France,
and had also allowed Consten to register the French trademark "GINT,"
which was affixed to all licensed products manufactured by Grundig, as a
means of keeping Grundig products not supplied to Consten by Grundig
out of France. Thus, Consten was intended to have the French market to
himself; he could not sell outside it, but neither could other parties sell
within it. Similar arrangements were in force with distributors of Grundig
in other member states.
When other importers bought Grundig products bearing the "GINT"
mark into France and offered them for resale, Consten sued alleging interference with the exclusive distributorship as well as trademark infringement. While these suits were pending, the Commission ruled that the
exclusive dealing arrangement and trademark license were in contravention
of Article 85. Both Grundig and Consten brought actions for annulment of
the Commission's ruling.
The European Court of Justice held the suits could not be maintained as
both the export prohibition arrangement, and the attempt to reserve the
French market through the trademark license contravened Article 85. The
Court did not invalidate the "GINT" mark, itself, but only its exercise
through the license agreement intended to reserve the French market to the
69
licensee.
The same principle was applied in the more recent Sirena decision, 70 in
which the Court refused, under Article 85, to allow the owner of an Italian
trademark for cosmetic products to use his mark to preclude import of the
same product from Germany by a lawful user of the mark in that country.
In Sirena, both the German and Italian parties had acquired rights to the
mark in their respective countries from the same party, but the Italian
holder had purchased his outright in 1937, incidental to the purchase of the
entire Italian business relating to manufacture and sale of the marked
product.
68
Grundig-Verkaufs, GmbH and Establissements Consten S.A. v. EEC Commission,
Court of Justice Cases No.'s 56/64 and 58/64, Recueil XI1-4, 429 (1966), CCH COMMON
MARKET REP. para. 8046 (Transfer Binder 1961- 1966).
69
1n the author's view this distinction between the exercise and the existence of industrial
property rights is untenable in practice; how one can enjoy or profit from existence of a right
without being able to enforce it is not clear. Nonetheless, it is obvious the Court feels itself
impelled to this distinction by Articles 36 and 222, mentioned infra.
70
Sirena S.R.L. v. Eda S.R.L., Court of Justice Case No. 40/70, Recueil XVII, 197 1, 69

(1971), 2 CCH COMMON MARKET REP. para. 810 1.
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The major difference between Sirena and Grundig-Consten under Article 85, is that the Court, in Sirena,was not averse to stretching to find the
'agreement' necessary to bring an exercise of marks which seeks to establish absolute territorial protection within the ambit of Article 85. It can be
expected in the future that the Court might stretch even further, and would
be willing to imply an agreement where none exists on paper.
In Sirena, the Court also said that a trademark holder does not have a
dominant position under Article 86, merely because he can prohibit third
parties from marketing products within the protected state. He must be
able to prevent effective competition in the relevant market as well. A
higher price for the marked product can be an abuse of a dominant position, if it cannot be justified by objective evidence (e.g., higher costs in the
protected state).
Sirena left open the possible loophole that national unfair-competition
law could be used by an exclusive distributor to block third parties' imports
into his territory. This was put to rest by the Beguelin case7 ' in which the
Court held French unfair competition law could not be used in combination
with an exclusive distribution contract to bar the importation, at least
where the only unfair act was parallel importation.
In the very fundamental Deutsche Grammophon case, 72 the Court dealt
with the special German protection, akin to copyright, which accords
sound-recording manufacturers exclusive rights of sale in Germany of
records made in that country. The record manufacturer supplied the
records in question to its French subsidiary, from whom they were purchased, reimported by a circuitous route into Germany, and offered for sale
at a reduced price below that at which Deutsche Grammophon permitted
them to be sold. Deutsche Grammophon attempted to obtain an injunction
against import, but this was deemed incompatible with the principle of free
movement of goods. In the Court's words,
It conflicts with the provisions regarding the free movement of goods in the
Common Market if a manufacturer of recordings so exercises the exclusive
right granted to him by the legislation of a member-State to market the
71

Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export S.A. Court of Justice Case No. 22/71

(Nov. 25, 1971), 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.para. 8,149, (1971) Comm. Mkt. L.R. 81. N.b.:
The Beguelin case was concerned with the special French unfair competition doctrine of
opposabilitiaux tiers; this is quite different from Anglo-American unfair competition theories
of "passing off," and the latter in the author's judgment remains to be tested under EEC
competition law as a means of preventing parallel imports as well as for other purposes.
Considering that a major aspect of trademark legislation is to protect consumers so they know
what 72they are buying (see Sirena), a passing-off argument could have substance.
Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co.
K.g., Court of Justice Case No. 78/70 (June 8, 1971), 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 8,106,

(1971) Common Market Rep. 63 1.
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protected articles as to prohibit the marketing in that member-state of products that have been sold by him himself or with his consent in another
member-state, solely because
this marketing has not occurred in the territory
73
of the first member-state.
The Court in Deutsche Grammophon, following Sierna, also said that
holding of the German industrial property right, by itself, was not a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86. Only if exercise of the right
enables the holder to prevent competition in a considerable part of the
market will Article 86 apply. Offer of the goods in question by the party
seeking protection at a higher price than the importer, if not explainable on
objective grounds, can be conclusive proof of abuse of dominant position.
In the patent field, the only European Court decision thus far is
Parke-Davis, 74 which antedated Sirena and Deutsche Grammophon.
There, the Court was confronted with a suit by a patent holder in the
Netherlands to bar importation of a drug from Italy, where patent protection for drugs is not permitted under national patent law. (In this respect
the case is similar to Deutsche Grammophon, for the German protection
for record manufacturers was not available under French law). In
Parke-Davis, the Court went the opposite way from Deutsche Grammophon and upheld the patentee's claim. The Court said the invocation of
patent rights to bar importation was not in violation of either Article 85 or
86.
The Case Law in Perspective
Reconciliation of Grundig-Consten, Sirena, Beguelin and Deutsche
Grammophon, on one hand, with Parke-Davis and the traditional view of
the protections accorded by industrial property law, on the other, is very
difficult, but five points should be noted about the cases:
I. The holding of Deutsche Grammophon on exhaustion of the German
record-manufacturer's protection against imports was made independently
of Article 85 or 86, and is best understood as an industrial property law
decision, based on the principle of free movement of goods.
2. As regards Article 85, in Sirena the Court was relying on an agreement, albeit a very antecedent one, for application of Article 85. The
situation is the same in Beguelin and Grundig-Consten, where the agreements were much stronger factors. If there had been no agreement whatsoever in Sirena, and the German importer had acquired its right to the
73

1d., (197 1)Common Market Law Rep. 631 at 659.
Parke-Davis & Co. v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm & Centrafarm Co's., Court
of Justice Case No. 24/67, Recueil XIV-2, 81 (1968), CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 8054
(Transfer Binder 1967- 1970).
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mark independently, or trademark protection could not be obtained for the
mark in Germany, Sirena would probably have come down the other way
under Article 85.
3. As regards Article 86, in each of Deutsche Grammophon, Sirena and
Parke-Davis, the Court was confronted with a substantial price differential
between the plaintiff's prices and the defendant-importer's prices. The
Court became progressively more emphatic in each case about the effect of
a price differential under Article 86, to the point that in Deutsche
Grammophon, which is the most recent of the three, it said a price
differential, if not explainable on obiective grounds, can be conclusive
evidence of an Article 86 abuse. This "toughening" of the formula may
pressage increased attention on Article 86 in cases of this nature, but to
date Article 86 has been much less of a threat to use of industrial property
rights than Article 85.
Moreover, in all these cases, the Court was careful to point out that
holding of an industrial property right in a member state, the national law
of which gives the holder the right to exclude importations is not, by itself,
an abuse of a dominant position. The holder must also be able to prevent
effective competition in the market. Presumably, in order to determine the
effect on competition, market analysis and the position of other manufacturers and sellers must be considered. This means that Article 86 will only
apply in certain cases where a substantial anti-competitive effect on the
market can be shown. Thus, it is unlikely that Article 86 could ever be
used as a general solution to the problem of using industrial property rights
to bar importations into one member state from other member states.
4. In Parke-Davis, the products were originally marketed in Italy by a
third party and were not patentable. If the Court had allowed them to be
resold in Holland, Parke- Davis' Dutch patent would have been rendered
worthless. Thus, absence of patent protection in the state of the first sale
was a key factor in Parke-Davis.
If Parke- Davis, itself, had first marketed the products in Italy, the case
would have been more difficult, but the same reasoning applies: Since
patent protection was not available in Italy, to allow free import to Holland
by third parties would have deprived Parke- Davis of much of the value of
its Dutch patent. If the Deutsche Grammophon reasoning were applied to
this situation, Parke-Davis should have had to refrain entirely from selling
Italy in order to protect its Dutch patent. This would clearly not have been
a good result in the terms of the Community concept of one unified
European market.
5. In Deutsch Grammophon, and Sirena as well, the Court emphasized
that the kinds of industrial property rights differ from each other, and some
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
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may be entitled to more protection than others. This suggests that patents
are more important than trademarks or copyrights; indeed, the Court said
as much in Sirena. If so, Parke-Davis is saved, but it probably should be
confined to the situation of absence of patent protection in the state of first
sale.
In addition, one must bear in mind, Article 36 of the Treaty, which
purports to recognize national industrial property rights so long as they are
not used as means of discrimination or restriction on trade between member states. If this is to mean anything, it must mean these rights are valid
except as EEC law has overriden them. Article 222 of the Treaty also
says that the Treaty shall not prejudice the systems of property ownership
in the member states.
Synthesis of the Current Development
The preceeding considerations suggest the following four tentative conclusions, relative to the interplay of EEC law and national industrial
property laws, and in particular about the continued viability of national
industrial property rights as means of blocking imports into a member
country:
1. The problem of parallel industrial property rights held in several
Community countries by a common holder or holders acting in agreement
is solved on the marketing level after the first sale of the goods by
Deutsche Grammophon. The first marketing in any protected state will
exhaust the protection. Thereafter, the goods can be freely imported into
any Community country and the common holder cannot object. Although
Deutsche Grammophon was not, strictly speaking, a parallel industrial
property right case, because the German rights in question did not exist in
France, its rationale applies afortiori to parallel situations.
The justification of this result is that the holder has had the benefit of his
industrial property protection by first sale, and to let him enjoy a further
monopoly by way of barring importations to other member states of the
products he has marketed is incompatible with the purposes of the Common Market. Deutsche Grammophon, of course, only dealt with a right
akin to copyright, but most authorities feel it will be extended to parallel
trademarks and patents.
11. In non-parallel situations, if a party with only trademark or copyright
protection in one Community country markets goods subject to the protection in another Community country where no protection exists, likely he
cannot bar reimportation following Deutsche Grammophon. He has a betInternational Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
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ter chance in the case of patented goods under Parke-Davis. The ratio75
nale of the distinction lies with the greater importance of patent rights.

III. The Court has not yet dealt with parallel patent protection at the
manufacturing level. A common holder may still be able to divide territories and avoid competition at this level by exclusive licenses for protected countries. Indeed, the "Christmas Message" explicitly sanctioned
territorial divisions for manufacturing licenses and this was upheld in the
76

Scott Paper announcement.
A caveat must be drawn, however, for exclusive manufacturing licenses
for products to be marketed in narrow "oligopolistic" markets where the

manufactured products cannot be transported readily and cheaply from
other manufacturing locations. In the recent Commission ruling in the
Burroughs cases, 77 involving in part two exclusive manufacturing licenses

for a special kind of carbon paper under Burroughs' French and German
patents respectively, the Commission was careful to point out that exclusive manufacturing licenses limit licensors as well as licensees. Licensors, as a result of exclusivity, lose the faculty of licensing others and the

territory of an exclusive marketing license can, thus, effectively be reserved to the licensee.
In these cases, the exclusive manufacturing licenses did not violate
Article 85 because the licensees had only small portions of the relevant
75

1n a paper entitled A Common Market Overview of the Competition Problem in the
Seventies, published in the American Bar Association's booklet CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF

(Theberge, ed., Chicago, 1971) p. 58 at p. 60, Dr. Herman
Schumacher, Director of the Division of General Competition Policy, Directorate-General
for Competition, Commission of the European Communities, made the following remarks
relative to conclusions I and 11 (Dr. Schumacher was writing prior to the Deutsche Grammophon decision):
Trademark law and also patent law in particular, are time and again misused to
maintain the national frontiers by arranging for absolute territorial protection. Where
several firms are parties to such market-sharing, and where there is proof of the existence
of agreements or concerted practices for the purposes of market-sharing, I do not doubt
that Article 85 is applicable. To avoid misunderstanding however, I must say that, in my
opinion, allocation to a patent licensee of a specific area within which to operate is
admissible. However, once a product has been legally put into circulation it must be able
to move freely within the Common Market. The only exception to this is when the
product has been manufactured by a firm without a license to do so in a part of the
Common Market where the patent is not protected. If this product were also to move
freely, the existence of the patent would be jeopardized.
Trademark law, on the other hand, cannot warrant territorial restrictions as it only
relates to the affixing of a distinctive mark. This has been made clear by the Sirena
judgment.
76
Scott Paper Co., J.O. Oct. 24, 1968, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 9263 (Transfer
Binder April, 1965-Dec. 1969 (out of print) ).
77Burroughs-Delplanque, J.O. Jan. 17, 1972, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 9485 and
Burroughs/Geha Werke, J.O. Jan. 17, 1972, CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 9486; see also
Davidson Rubber Co., J.O. June 23, 1972, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 9512.
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markets, the goods were easily transportable from other manufacturing
locations at little cost, and other licensees, as well as Burroughs, itself,
could compete at the marketing level. The negative implication, however,
of the Commission's stress on these facts is that an Article 85 violation
could arise for an exclusive manufacturing license if the situation were
opposite.
IV. The case of purely unilateral exercise of industrial property right
protection by a holder or his licensee to bar imports, where an entirely
independent and unrelated party has first marketed them, either with industrial property protection or not in one Community country and another
unrelated party is trying to import them into the protected country, does
not seem to have been changed. In these situations, the national law
protection should remain valid. 78 In other words, if a naked infringer tries
to import goods to a protected country, the goods have not been marketed
by the holder of the protection or persons related to him, and there is no
connection between him and the infringer, the protection should still be
available. This is considerably less firm, however, for trademarks than
patents, in view of the differences in purpose of the two kinds of rights.
It will be seen that these four conclusions go far to reaching the Common Market Patent Project solution to the parallel import problem, yet still
leave much of the protection of national law intact.
Broadly, only if one is involved (a) in a joint action of market restriction
within the meaning of Article 85, or (b) in acting unilaterally he has
exhausted his protection by marketing in another member state with parallel protection in the case of patents, with or without it in the case of
trademarks and copyrights, or (c) is invoking rights in a situation where an
abuse under Article 86 can be established, will he be likely not to be able
to use industrial property rights in the traditional way.
To be complete, it must be observed that the case law has not yet
reached the problem of direct sales by parallel licensees into each other's
territory. To illustrate, assume a U.S. licensor has made exclusive manufacturing and sales licenses of parallel patents to licensees in each of
France, the Netherlands and the U.K., each license covering the same
product and extending only to the national territory of each licensee.
Although it is clear from what has been said under Point (1) above that
once, for example, the U.K. licensee has sold a product under the license
in the U.K., it can then move to France, notwithstanding objections by the
French licensee or the licensor, it has not been decided whether the U.K.
licensee can sell directly in France in the teeth of the French parallel
78

Cf Submissions of Advocate General Lamothe in Sirena, supra note 70.
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licensee. Although prediction of how the law will develop on this problem
enters the realm of "pure speculation," it would seem a logical corollary of
the free movement of goods principle to allow parallel licensees to sell into
each other's territories, particularly in instances where the products are
marketed directly by manufacturers to end-users without the intervention
of "middlemen." Anything less would resurrect the possibility of "market
compartmentalization," which has been the bte noire of both the Commission and the European Court to date.
Ramifications for Licensing
The practical result of this synthesis for licensing, as far as territorial
restrictions are concerned, is that devices such as multiple parallel licenses
and cross licenses can no longer be used to ensure absolute territorial
protection for licensees.
On the other hand, considerable room is left to enter into exclusive
licenses at the marketing as well as manufacturing levels, so long as
absolute territorial protection is not attempted for marketing. Indeed, exclusive patent licenses-requiring the licensor not to license third parties
and prohibiting him from utilizing the invention himself-were explicitly
sanctioned in the "Christmas Message 79 on the theory that they are not
greatly different from assignments of rights and are not likely to affect trade
between member states. However, when isolation of a national market is
attempted by an exclusive license (or an assignment) of industrial property
rights, it is very much open to doubt whether exercise of the industrial
property rights is compatible with the Treaty. 0
Affirmative guidance for exclusive marketing arrangements (i.e. distributorships) can be obtained from Regulation 67/67, relating to bi-lateral
exclusive dealing contracts. 8 ' These are contracts (not necessarily involving licenses) in which one of the parties undertakes to deliver goods to
the other for resale in a specified territory, or one party agrees to purchase
products for resale only from the other party. The regulation exempts such
agreements from Article 85(1) so long as the only other restraints on the
exclusive dealer do not amount to more than: (a) provisions not to manufacture or sell competing products during the life of the contract and for
one year thereafter, and (b) obligations not to advertise, establish a branch,
or maintain a distribution warehouse outside the contract territory.
It is a fair inference that this exemption extends to exclusive marketing
79
Supra
8

note 63.
s'Cf. Remington Rand Italia S.P.A. v. Innovazione Electromarket S.R.L., (1968) COMM.
MKT. L. REP. 249, Commission action, 8 Bulletin of the European Communities 40 (1969).
81
Supra note 64.
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licenses of industrial property rights, so long as the requirements of Article
3 of the Regulation are met. Article 3 states that the exemption of the
Regulation will not apply (a) to exclusive cross-licenses by competing
parties, or (b) to cases where the parties make it difficult for others to
obtain the products in question from other dealers in the Common Market,
especially where industrial property rights are so used. The reference to
industrial property rights, no doubt, is a direct result of the Grundig-Consten holding,8 2 which came down shortly before Regulation 67/67
was issued.
Certain additional kinds of typical restrictions are specifically allowed by
Regulation 67/67, and one can feel free to include them in exclusive
marketing licenses. These include:
(a) The obligation to purchase complete lines of products or minimum quantities:
(b) The obligation to sell the products under the trademark or packaging
prescribed by the manufacturer;
(c) The obligation to undertake certain sales promotion measures, in particular:
to advertise;
to maintain a sales network or stock;
to assume responsibility for customer service and guarantees;
to employ personnel having specialized or technical training.
Other Kinds of Licensing Provisions under EEC Law
Extrapolating further from the cases and Commission announcements,
the following seems to be the current situation on other typical licensing
restrictions:
1. Limitations on the ways a licensed patent may be exploited: The
"Christmas Message" permits division of the 'bundle of rights' conferred
by a patent into rights to make, use or sell. The license may be limited to
any of the three.
Licenses may also be limited as to time (i.e. shorter, but not longer, than
the patent period), as to field of use, and as to area (i.e. a regional license
for a portion of the territory where the patent is granted, or to one specific
factory).
The rationale of the exemption of these kinds of provisions from Article
85, is that they all relate to rights conferred by the patent itself, and the
patentee is free to deal with them as he would be to sell or assign all or part
of his rights.
2. Sublicenses and assignments: The Commission's decisions in Da82

Supra note 68.
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vidson Rubber Co.8 3 and the two Burroughs cases 8 4 held that explicit or
implicit prohibitions on granting sublicenses of patents or know-how were
not restraints on competition. The "Christmas Message" also approved
restrictions upon grant of sublicenses and non-assignment clauses, i.e.
limitations of grant of license rights to certain persons.
3. Minimum royalty: A minimum royalty provision was upheld in
Burroughs-Deplanque.In Raymond-Nagoya85 a clause providing that a
license was to become non-exclusive rather than exclusive if a certain
minimum amount of royalties was not paid was also upheld.
4. Royalty term-patent license: The Commission's Henkel/Colgate 86
decision made it clear that patent royalties should not exceed the term of a
licensed patent.
5. Royalty term-know-how license: The term of know-how royalties
on licenses to be granted was intended by the contract in Henkel/Colgate
to be limited to the applicable patent term of the country where such
know-how licenses were to be in force, and this was considered not unduly
87
long.
6. Royalty rates, patented and unpatented products: Burroughs/Geha
Werke approved an arrangement in a combined patent, trademark and
know-how license for a 50 percent reduction of royalties when the products were sold without patent protection.
7. Separate royalties for each patent (package royalties): Henkel/Colgate cites with approbation that royalties were to be calculated
separately for each patent licensed.
8. Discriminatory royalty rates and rate variation: Henkel/Colgate
indicates that differing royalties for two or more licensees may be used in a
manner which will give rise to a market sharing problem under Article 85,
so care should be exercised in setting different royalty rates and clearly
discriminatory rates should be avoided.
9. "Most favored licensee" clauses: A provision ensuring that a licensee would have the most favorable royalty rate given to any other
licensee of the same licensor was allowed in Raymond-Nagoya.
10. Quantitative restrictions:The Burroughs cases allowed imposition
of requirements on the licensees that they produce quantities sufficient to
satisfy demand. The "Christmas Message" seems to allow restrictions on

Rubber Co., J.O. June 23, 1972 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 9512.
Supra note 77.
85Raymond-Nagoya, J.O. June 23, 1972, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 9513.
86Henkel/Colgate, J.0. Jan. 18, 1972, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.para. 9491.
87
See also Davidson Rubber Co., supra note 83.
"Davidson
84
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maximum as well as minimum quantities and on the number of times a
licensed process is to be used.
I1. Qualitative restrictions and technical criteria: The "Christmas Message" allowed standards of quality as well as technical production criteria
to be imposed on licensees and this was followed both in the Burroughs
cases and Raymond-Nagoya. The rationale of the Commission was that
these restrictions had the sole purpose of permitting technically adequate
exploitation of the licensed patents.
12. Tied source of supply: Requirements that licensees purchase supplies from a certain source insofar as they are unique and indispensable to
proper technical exploitation of a licensed patent were sanctioned in the
"Christmas Message," but here one should tread cautiously, as the EEC
law is certain to receive further development and in many cases these
arrangements are prohibited by national law.
13. Trademark license, obligatory marking of products: The Burroughs
cases held that non-exclusive licenses to use the patentee's trademark, and
requirements to indicate on the products that they were made under license
from Burroughs were not restrictions of competition. The licensees had the
right to use other marks as well. The arrangements were deemed to facilitate qualitative and quantitative control by Burroughs of the licensed
products.
14. Obligations to affix patent information on the licensed product:
These were approved by the "Christmas Message."
15. Grant-back clauses: The "Christmas Message" sanctioned agreements concerning the mutual communication of know-how acquired during
the license and the mutual granting of licenses on improvements or new
uses. However, this permission is conditional on the requirement that the
grant-back clauses be non-exclusive and reciprocal between licensor and
licensee. Clauses calling for mutual communication of know-how were also
approved in the Burroughs cases. In Raymond-Nagoya, the Commission
required amendment of a grant-back clause to make the grant-back
non-exclusive.
16. Know-how secrecy: In Burroughs-Deplanque the licensee was obliged to keep secret the know-how furnished by Burroughs, during the
period of the license and ten years thereafter, and to use it only as
authorised by the contract. The licensee was also obliged to return all
designs, models, etc., embodying know-how to Burroughs ninety days after
termination of the contract. The license agreement was for ten years,
renewable from year to year thereafter and cancelable on twelve months'
notice. A similar secrecy requirement was imposed in BurroughslGeha
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
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Werke, but only for the period of the contract, which was for an intitial
term of seventeen years.
The Commission upheld both of these secrecy agreements. In Burroughs-Deplanque,it noted that secrecy is an essential element of licensing
of unpatented know-how so long as it is not in the public domain. One may
infer from this that know-how secrecy provisions will receive liberal treatment in EEC competition law, but to date there has been very little policy
or legal development regarding know-how contracts.
17. Licensee estoppel clauses: In Burroughs/Geha Werke the Commission noted with apparent approval, that the parties had revoked a clause in
their contract prohibiting the licensee from contesting the patents or patent
application of the licensor. One is not certain from the presentation of the
case why the parties revoked this clause. The revocation may well have
been made for reasons other than EEC law. (It may have been done
because German cartel authorities have taken the position that these
clauses should be modified in the cases of patents issued by EEC countries; 88 alternatively, it may have been prompted by Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.)
However, any ambiguity in the Commission's position in BurroughslGeha
Werke was clarified in Davidson Rubber Co., in which the Commission
clearly insisted upon deletion of non-attach clauses prior to granting exemptions for the licenses in question.
18. Licensors setting prices fbr licensees: There are as yet no firm
indications of how the EEC authorities will judge price-fixing provisions in
license agreements, but in view of the legal development in this area in
France, Germany and America, it seems highly likely such arrangements
will be deemed interdicted by Article 85(l).89
19. Patent pools and .joint research companies: The Henkel/Colgate
decision points out that patent pools are not as free in deciding upon
licensing policy as would be single patentees. This is one reason why the
Commission in that case required, as a condition of granting exemption
from Article 85, that details of all future licenses of the Henkel and Colgate
joint research company be notified to it. More generally, HenkkellColgate
also teaches that joint venture agreements, whether for research or other
purposes, between competing companies always carry the danger of concerted action within the meaning of Article 85(1).
"8German Cartel Office (Bundeskartelamt) Tdtigkeitsbericht 1969, p. 98, discussed in
Alexander, supra note 66, § 126, p. 258.
89Cf.. Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren, J.O. Jan. 17, 1972, 2 CCH COMMON MARKET REP. para. 9492: Nederlandse Cement-Handelmaatschappij N.V., J.O. Jan. 26, 1972, 2
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 9493: but compare the Commission's reply to Written Question No. 247/71,J.O. Nov. 13, 1971,2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.para, 9471.
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20. "Specialization" agreements: In SOPELEMILangen9° among the
most recent of several cases of this type, two competing manufacturers of
highly technical control equipment for use in hydraulic automation devices
each agreed to specialize in different fields of the industry. Each party took
an exclusive license to sell in its country, the equipment manufactured by
the other (effectively an exclusive reciprocal supply agreement), and each
discontinued manufacture of the equipment in the other's special field, and
agreed not to develop any new equipment competing with the other's
"specialty."
Although this agreement clearly fell within the prohibitions of Article
85(l), the Commission granted it on exemption under Article 85(3). The
Commission noted that competition is keen and diffuse in this industry and
that the agreement could contribute to increase of production, better distribution and advancement of technology, because it allowed each party to
concentrate on the part of the business which it knew best and for which it
was best equipped. As the facts of this case certainly pointed to a severe
competition law infraction at first blush, the Commission's decision suggests a wide scope for exemption of "specialization agreements" of this
kind in the future if a case for production or distribution rationalization can
be made. 9 '
21. Arbitration clauses: These have been accepted in numerous decisions, and seem to pose no competition law problem.
EEC Competition Law in Overview
Viewed as a corpus of law, the European competition decisions can be
seen to have two dimensions: Not only are the European authorities
concerned with maintaining free competition in the working of their market
along the lines of the American anti-trust model, they are also, perhaps
primarily, concerned in their competition policy with creation of the one
unified "common" market envisioned by the Rome Treaty.
In the latter field, they have focused their attack on commercial arrangements which maintain the traditional fractionated character of the European market, and derogate from the single unified market ideal. This
attack has already had a very significant impact on the traditional uses of
industrial property rights, including licensing.
90

SOPELEM/Langen, I.O. Jan. 17, 1972, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para. 9488.
See also: MAN/SAVIEM, J.O. Feb. 4, 1972, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. para 9494;
Wild/Leitz, J.O. Oct. 9, 1971, 2 CCH COMM. MkT. REP. para. 9462. On July 20, 1972, the
Commission issued a proposed group exemption on specialization agreements which is likely
to become effective by the end of 1972. The proposed regulation is discussed in the author's
Specialization Agreements; Development of a Major Exception to the Competition Rules of
the Rome Treaty, INT'L B.J. (Nov. 1972).
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This second ("market creation") dimension of European competition
policy is at least partly responsible for the differences in emphasis between
competition law in Europe and the United States. While market division on
territorial lines has been almost "the whole problem" to date in Europe, it
2
has been much less of a problem in America?
On the side of the "working" of their market, the Europeans have also
proclaimed themselves in favour of free competition. If this has not been in
a pure "Adam Smith" sense, at least it is in terms of promoting competition
between enterprises and avoiding undue private restraints of trade within
the spirit of Articles 85 and 86. However, except as the efforts in this area
have overlapped with the attack on market dividing arrangements, enforce93
ment has been much less rigorous.
In part this lack of rigor is probably due to the fact that the Europeans
are not "deep down" so firmly wedded to pure competition philosophy as
the Americans. Certainly the "legislative mandate" is less strong and
politically more delicate to apply in Europe than in America. It must also
be recognized that achievement of the unified market goal is the more
urgent need.
One detects also a "schizophrenia" in European competition policy:
Concomitantly with development of a free competition policy under Articles 85 and 86, the Europeans have expressed a desire to promote
co-operation, consolidation and fusion between enterprises, to develop
large business groupings with sufficient wherewithal to meet "the American
challenge." It seems likely that contradictions met in carrying out these
cross purposes have debilitated the "pure competition" thrusts.
In the licensing field, one is left with the result that territorial divisions,
however attempted, are the most suspect from the competition-law standpoint. Many of the other issues which are "up" for licensing in America
remain to be developed in Europe, but it seems inevitable that they will
receive attention as the Common Market system consolidates and strengthens.
One is also left with the impression from the European cases, that
economic analysis will play an increasing role in European anti-trust development. With the possible exception of the "red flag" of export prohibitions clauses, there has been very little development of per se illegality
rules. Rather, one is taught by the cases to look at the reasonableness of
92Cf. Dam, Exclusive Distributorships in the United States and the European Economic
Community, XVI THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 111, 124 (1971).
93
For a strong critique, see Moss, The European Community Still Has No Competition
Policy, which originally appeared in French in LE MONDE DE'L'ECONOMIE, Dec. 15, 1970, p.
14, translated and reprinted in XVI THE ANTI-TRUST BULLETIN 443 (197 1).
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I

112

INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER

restrictions in their context, and their impact on the relevant market in a
manner similar to the American technique.
Use of the economic approach helps to ensure that competition rules
will operate only to impede business arrangements in cases of significant
economic impact on market conditions. Although this approach makes for
less predictability-and therefore makes the legal advisor's job more
difficult-the flexibility it affords should be welcomed. Per se illegality rules
leave little room for adaptation to commercial needs, and are often worse
94
than the maladies they are meant to cure.
Conclusion
Negotiation and preparation of licensing agreements have long been
standard fare for lawyers in international practice, but it would be a
mistake to regard the lawyer's work in licensing as routine.
The ingredients of a successful license require the utmost care in selection and preparation. Their mixing en casserole, to produce an agreement
which successfully meets the many problems currently afoot in the licensing field affords considerable scope for the creative lawyer comma chef de
cuisine.
Sad to say, the delicacy of the soufflt may not be readily appreciated,
due to lack of sophistication about the legal aspects of licensing on the part
of many of the "consumers" of the lawyer's efforts. This means the lawyer
must educate his clients to the importance of obtaining sound legal advice
in licensing at an early stage, and following it, a task which is sometimes
quite difficult in Europe where many licensing functions are normally
performed by laymen.
The consequence of the lawyer's non-participation early in the game is
usually, at best, renegotiation of several points when he does come in; at
worst, disaster. Indeed, the ground rules for licensing are changing so
rapidly, the lawyer, himself, has a substantial task to keep abreast of
current developments.
Finally, we must not forget that licensing agreements, for the lawyers, no
less than the parties, have the feature that they must be lived with and
made to work over a period of time, subject to changing conditions. This'
means that a major part of a lawyer's job in licensing must be to anticipate
future developments and problems. In addition to a crystal ball, vigilance
and attention to detail are necessary tools of the soothsayer.
94
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American Bar Association at the 1971 London Meeting. Proceedings of the sessions have

been published in 40

THE ANTITRUST JOURNAL,

Issue No. 4.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I

InternationalLicensing Agreements

113

APPENDIX
Checklist for Drafting
License Agreement
1.

Introduction
A. Parties
B. Effective date of agreement
C. Place where agreement made

D. Licensed subject matter (refer to schedule)
E. General rights licensed
11.

F. Background of agreement
Grant

A. Exclusive or non-exclusive
B. Make, have made, use and/or sell

C. Other limitations or restrictions
(i) Less than all claims
(ii) Territory
(iii) Quantity
(iv) Style or size
(v) Field of use
D. Sublicenses

(i) Terms and conditions
(ii) Duration
(iii) Furnishing of copies to licensor
111.

Consideration

A. Lump sum or fixed annual payments
B. Royalties
(i) Rate
(ii) Bases
(a) Net sales of patented devices
(b) Amount of raw materials

(c) Number of articles
(d) Total sales
(iii) Minimum
(a) Full term of agreement
(b) Lesser period
(c) Upon failure to pay
I. License converted to non-exclusive
2. License subject to cancellation
(iv) Maximum
(a) In each year
(b) In total
(v) Most favored licensee
(a) Royalties
(b) Other terms and conditions
C. Tax considerations
The author acknowledges indebtedness to Nordhaus, Patent License Agreements, BUSIApril, 1966, p. 643 at p. 657.
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IV.

V.
VI.

VII.

VIii.

IX.

X.

Royalties Payable
A. Time of reports
B. Time of payments
C. Audit of books and records
D. Time limitation on right to examine
Effect of Invalidity of Patent on Royalty Payments
Other obligations and Warrantiesof Licensor
A. 'Improvements developed by licensor
(i) Royalties for use
(ii) Definition
(iii) Period of obligation
B. Warranties
(i) Licensed device works
(ii) Commercial utility of licensed invention
(iii) Validity of patent
(iv) Non-infringement of third party patents
C. Indemnification for licensee's infringement.
Other Obligations of Licensee
A. Non-attack and acknowledgement of patent validity (Query: Lear v.
Adkins)
B. Exploitation
C. Patent marking
D. Grant-backs
Ancillary Provisions
A. Enforcement of patent
(i) Severally or jointly by parties
(ii) Expenses and recoveries
B. Foreign patents
C. Technical assistance and know-how
(i) Drawings and specifications
(ii) Visitation rights
(iii) Personal supervision
(iv) Compensation
(v) Employment or consulting agreement
(vi) Return of, after termination
(vii) Right to continue to use after termination
(viii) Abatement of royalties clause
D. Release for past infringement
E. Patent application
(i) Effect of non-allowance of claims or denial of patent
(ii) Responsibility and costs of prosecution
F. Trademark
Duration
A. Effective date
B. Expiration date
C. Option to cancel prior to normal expiration
Termination
A. Upon breach of agreement
(i) Notice of Breach
(ii) Period of remedy
(iii) Notice of cancellation
B. Bankruptcy or insolvency of license
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XI.
XII.

XIII.

Choice of Law
Formal Provisions
A. Entire agreement
B. Assignment of agreement or rights
C. Notices
(i) Written
(ii) Manner of Service
(iii) When effective
D. Force majeure
E. Arbitration
Signature of Parties
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